The timing of the release of thousands of classified U.S. documents on the whistleblower website appropriately named "Wikileaks" is ominous for Pakistan. The documents detail connections between the Taliban and other militant groups and the ISI. They mostly relates to the past six years, when Pakistan's present military leadership and its intelligence apparatus were at the helm of affairs.
Whatever the veracity of these documents and notwithstanding the vehement denials by Pakistani officials, it is a lot of egg on Islamabad's face. The U.S. administration has assured Pakistan that it will be business as usual between the two governments despite the embarrassing leaks. But will it?
With the role of the Pakistani military in the war on terror being discussed in the public domain, the pressure being exerted on Islamabad to do more by its Western benefactors is bound to increase manifold. The ISI's efforts to broker a deal between Karzai and the Haqqani network have also received a setback.
The leaks, which are no less significant than the Pentagon Papers that surfaced during the Vietnam War, could have far-reaching consequences for Pakistan, whose complicity with militants has never been in doubt in the eyes of the West. Perhaps emboldened by the leaks, British Prime Minister David Cameron, who is presently on a visit to India, had no qualms in coming hard on Islamabad on the issue of terrorism. His Indian hosts must be extremely pleased by the turn of events.
As reported in the New York Times, one of the newspapers which scooped the leaks, several U.S. administration officials have privately expressed the hope that the Americans will be able to use the revelations. The officials referred to a "sometimes duplicitous Pakistani ally" to pressure Islamabad to cooperate more fully with the United States on counterterrorism. The newspaper quoted two other administration officials, raising the possibility of warning the Pakistanis that "congressional anger might threaten American aid."
The U.S. leaks surfaced in the immediate aftermath of Gen Kayani being given another term of three years as chief of the army staff. Had the government been tipped off about the embarrassing leaks beforehand by the U.S. administration, and hence the surprise announcement by Prime Minister Gilani in a late-night three-minute address on television? Another theory on the hasty announcement is that the matter of Gen Kayani's extension had become too intense a subject of debate in the media. Mostly negative articles started appearing in the print media about an extension being granted to the military chief, no matter how valid the reasons for the decision. Whatever the actual reason, however, neither the government nor the spokesmen of the military have bothered to explain it.
In countries where the principal of civilian control over the armed forces is sacrosanct, such appointments are a matter of routine and rarely raise an eyebrow. Even across the border, how many people even know the name of the Indian army chief? It is a sad commentary on our civilian leadership that in most comments in the Western media Gen Kayani is portrayed as "the most powerful man in Pakistan."
In his reaction to the media on Gen Kayani's extension, Barrister Aitzaz Ahsan, the leader of the lawyers' movement and a PPP stalwart, has lamented that we never learn from history. It will be interesting to examine what actually is our history in this context.
So far as Gen Kayani's extension is concerned, it is practically a first. Previously, such an extension was given to Gen Ayub Khan by President Iskander Mirza, who not an elected head of state. That came at a time when politicians were squabbling with each other and Ayub had already started conspiring for a military takeover. Ayub had no qualms in sending his benefactor home after a coup in October 1958.
It is interesting that, almost without exception, every general promoted out of turn bit the hand that fed him. Gen Yayha Khan, who superseded two generals, was designated commander-in-chief in March 1966. He deposed Field Marshal Ayub Khan three years later.
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto promoted Gen Ziaul-Haq to army chief in 1976 despite Zia's being junior-most among the corps commanders. He superseded seven corps commanders. Ziaul-Haq's claim to fame was that he was the greatest sycophant in the army.
As corps commander of Multan, he invited Bhutto to be honored as colonel-in-chief of the Armoured Corps. After the function, Ziaul Haq placed his hand on the Quran and said: "You are the savior of Pakistan and we owe it to you to be totally loyal to you." Ironically, the same "loyal general" deposed Bhutto a year after becoming army chief and then hanged him.
On the death of Asif Nawaz Janjua, Gen Abdul Waheed Kakar was promoted to army chief by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in January 1993. Gen Kakar superseded four generals. On Kakar's elevation, a Pakhtun like the president, an analyst commented that "the era of Pakhtuns had begun." However, barely six months later the president was shocked when his protege asked for his resignation, along with that of Nawaz Sharif.
In 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif promoted Gen Pervez Musharraf, the corps commander of Mangla, to chief of the army staff, over other senior officers. Gen Musharraf was one of the corps commanders who had sided with Nawaz Sharif during his tussle with President Leghari over Justice Sajjad Ali Shah.
Nawaz Sharif, who in his two stints as prime minister had not been able to get along with any of the army chiefs, wrongly calculated that Musharraf, being a Mohajir, had no constituency in the army and would therefore side with him. Musharraf, however, obliged by not only deposing Nawaz Sharif on Oct 12, 1999, but also handcuffing him, imprisoning him and having him tried on charges of hijacking, though he later spared his life by sending him into exile.
Jehangir Karamat, the general who had superseded none and had no political ambitions, had been sacked by Nawaz Sharif just a few months before he was due to retire. Nawaz, who vowed during his exile not to play footsie with the generals, has understandably refrained from commenting on the re-elevation of Gen Kayani.
Reportedly, he had advised President Zardari some months ago not to tinker with the promotion process as whoever is promoted to the top in the army is loyal to the institution, and in some cases to himself, rather than to the political leadership. Lt Gen Khalid Shameem Wyne should have been named as the next chief, but his being a Kashmiri, like the Sharifs, might have been a factor in Mr Zardari's not having him elevated.
Gen Kayani was appointed vice chief of staff on Oct 8, 2007, by Gen Musharraf and took over as COAS on Nov 28. Kayani had been Musharraf's trusted ISI chief for three years. As such, he was fully aware of, if not involved in, key decisions like the president's asking for the resignation of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry and the controversial raid on Lal Masjid, which cost many lives.
Musharraf naively assumed that as army chief Kayani would remain his trusted man, readily doing his bidding. To his disappointment, he was soon learnt that Kayani was his own man. As the new army chief Gen Kayani not only extricated the army from politics but is also credited with supporting the conduct of free and fair elections. Later he continued the hands-off policy by backing the civilian setup, only quietly playing a behind-the-scenes role for the restoration of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.
In many ways, Kayani is different from his predecessors. But despite all the valid reasons for the renewal of his term, the civilian government by default might have started the process of the advent of another "man on horseback."
http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2010/07/31/115370.html
No comments:
Post a Comment