As we shall see, Balochistan is another good example of the unintended consequences a central institution invading the legitimacy of a region’s political institutions can have. Instead of quickly fixing a problem, it spreads instability through the whole social fabric and alienates natural allies.
Historically Balochistan - much like the tribal areas of Pakistan - has benefited from a large degree of autonomy due in part to its tribal background. The Balochs are a tribal people descendant of an Iranian people who came to the Pakistan territory 900 years ago.
Balochistan was also the battle ground of a proxy war between the British and the Russians in the 19th century in the “Great Game” for resources and access to the sea in the Indian sub-continent and its northern areas.
Today, the autonomy of Balochistan is put into question as the Baloch Assembly sees increasingly its power compromised by the greater penetration of the central government in its affairs, which some see it as a potential source for civil war. The upheavals are perpetrated in particular by the arm of the Frontier Corps (FC) in Balochistan, a central paramilitary organization responsible for maintaining security in the border areas in Balochistan but also in the tribal lands to the north-east.
This has come to a point where analysts of Balochistan are talking about a “parallel government” ran through the apparatus of the FC.
This pressure -only going to increase in the new American strategy - comes in part from the US government who are seeking ways to defeat the Taliban by denying them sanctuary in Pakistan.
Similar efforts have been successful if we can see American agency in the Swat valley and South Waziristan offensives of 2009. But these offensives took place because a treaty between the tribal areas and the central government fell through from 2007 onward in the demise of President Pervez Musharaff. Then again, the strength, increasing ruthlessness and antagonism towards the central government by the tribal areas can be further traced back to the links with the American invasion of 2001 in Afghanistan.
North Waziristan, another trouble area, is under a current aerial drone campaign led by CIA and Special Forces working undercover in Pakistan and in the mountainous border regions of Afghanistan.
On the other hand, Baluchistan has been left relatively untouched despite the increasing role in the affairs of the province by the FC.
Many Balochistan people see the FC as a self serving entity, more concerned about increasing their power at the expense of the indigenous democratic Baloch institutions and enriching themselves instead of performing their duty of protecting the Baloch people, denying access to the border to the “bad” people and seeking out anti government and anti-afghan forces in the area. Targeting anti-afghan forces – the US interest – is often not on top of the list of the FC.
And yet the FC has received a substantial portion of the US aid versed to the Pakistani military in the recent years.
The behavior of the FC is somewhat similar to the roles independent commanders - large and small warlords - play on the other side of the border in lawless, anarchic portions of the Afghan territory. While the afghan equivalents emanate because of the anarchy and the weakness of the central government, the Baloch case exhibits a predatory and corrosive effect of already existing institutions. The tip in the balance comes from resources – arms, money, and external support – that is being given to the FC and not the Balochistan natural authorities.
The other forces in the region also threatening the autonomy of Baluchistan is, of course, the Taliban and other similarly minded groups. This is where things get so complicated because support for the Taliban comes from different sources. We have already seen that the FC sometimes is unconcerned with the Taliban and can also be quietly supportive. Similarly, within Baloch society at large there are those who reject the Taliban and wish to conserve and augment democratic and western liberal values, and those who have a soft spot in their heart for Muslim militancy and traditional values.
But even the democratic faction in Baloch who should favor efforts to defeat the presence of religious extremists in their midst seems to reject categorically the presence of the FC. This is because of FC’s conflict of interest, their corrosive effect on Baloch’s political institutions, and also the invasion of privacy and human rights. Much like in America there are debates over how much security can encroach on civil liberties, the people of Balochistan demand at what cost can the FC go after religious extremists and impose draconian measures like sealing the borders, clamping down on protests, intrusively investigating the public and carrying kinetic actions in the midst of the population.
The growing instability of Balochistan can be yet again a lesson for American endeavors as it tackles the tribal areas of Pashtunistan across the border: governance must be served through the bottom up instead of top down. No matter your intentions, external forces wielding military might entering a region will necessarily corrode indigenous political institutions - making the external force illegitimate. The external forces will also inevitably slowly shift its purpose becoming less inclined to battle fringe extremist insurgents and more inclined to self-serving privateering.
Throughout history, there are moving relative levels of power between the center and the regions whether in a state, an empire, or an inter-state balance of power. Sometimes, the “barons” are stronger and sometimes the king is. Clearly, given the socio-economic nature of the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the relatively weak means the Pakistani center or the Americans in Afghanistan have to bring about change, the tip of power must lie with the barons. An invading power using violence to change the conditions on the ground must be ready to do things neither the Pakistani nor the Americans are ready to do or have the capacity to do in order to maintain power and achieve stability. These measures would include things like purging the local intelligentsia, establishing colonies or otherwise being ready to stay for the long run.
By David Cast
As a consequence, the money and support that went to the FC should have gone to the government of Balochistan. In the case where the Balochistan authorities were supporting actively enemies of the Pakistani government or US interests, efforts should have been made to support indigenous factions to dethrone the authorities. Instead, by passing local institutions is only likely to alienate the whole population of Balochistan, including your natural allies, and creates multiple levels of instability not only restricted to the authorities but within the political community and the nature of the regime.
http://davidcastonguay.blogspot.com/2010/01/instability-in-motion-balochistan.html
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