Two-thirds of the al Qaeda operatives killed or captured anywhere in the world have been found in Pakistan—that’s more than Afghanistan and Iraq combined.
Admiral Mike Mullen’s shocking testimony touched off a firestorm in Congress and a week of back-pedaling by the Obama administration.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s words had impact because he was long known as “Pakistan’s best friend in Washington” and had made more than two dozen trips to that nation since 2007.
So it surprised nearly everyone when Mullen said the Haqqani Network, a terror group akin to al Qaeda that attacked the U.S. embassy in Kabul for 20 bloody and brutal hours on Sept. 13, was a “veritable arm of the ISI,” Pakistan’s military intelligence service. That means that Pakistan, who receives some $3.4 billion in military and civil aid from the United States, is using proxy groups to attack the United States.
The off-the-record briefing was even scarier. When the corpses of the militants who attacked the embassy were searched, cell phones were found. American intelligence determined that those phones had called leaders of the Haqqani terror group and, this part was jaw-dropping: high-ranking members of Pakistan’s ISI.
The Obama administration has been trying to “walk back” Muller’s statements ever since. Muller didn’t mean to imply that the ISI commanded Haqqani as a general would a military unit, it just “inspired” the organization in picking its targets. This is an exceedingly fine distinction. The fact that it left operational details to the terror proxies on the ground is meaningless—and it may not even be true. Just because American intelligence does not have phone intercepts of ISI officers ordering the attack does not mean that the ISI didn’t order it. It only means that the U.S. doesn’t have a smoking gun.
The Admiral has refused to reverse his testimony, telling National Public Radio that he stands by every word of it.
The light marked “Islamabad” has been blinking red for a long time. The terror group that Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was investigating when he was abducted and killed was… the Haqqani Network and its links to the government of Pakistan.
Then there is the al Qaeda connection. Two-thirds of the al Qaeda operatives killed or captured anywhere in the world have been found in Pakistan—that’s more than Afghanistan and Iraq combined. Bin Laden was killed in a concrete castle some 800 yards from Pakistan’s equivalent of West Point. Ramzi Youssef, the first World Trade Center bomber, was captured in the F-7 diplomatic quarter of Pakistan’s capital, just down the street from a police station. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who planned the 9-11 attacks partly based on the sci-fi movie Independence Day, was captured in the home of a prominent Pakistani microbiologist and a leader in that nation’s largest political party. Al Qaeda was itself formed in Pakistan in 1989.
Plenty of other terrorists call Pakistan home. Remember Mir Amal Kansi, who shot several CIA officers as they turned into the spy agency’s main gate in 1993? He was captured in Pakistan. The Haqqani Network, which attacked the U.S. embassy a few weeks ago, is based in Pakistan, founded in Pakistan and run by a Pakistani citizen, who inherited the family business from his father, another citizen of Pakistan. Some of the shooters at the U.S. embassy in Kabul carried Pakistani national identity cards.
And this isn’t even the first attack by Pakistanis on U.S. civilians and soldiers. The Pentagon leaked an extremely detailed report to the New York Times this week, which revealed that uniformed Pakistani soldiers shot and killed a uniformed American colonel—as he walked away from a peace conference. The report was confirmed by named sources at the meeting, both Americans and Afghans. Pakistan later claimed the shooting was the work of a rogue soldier and that the other Pakistani soldiers were actually shooting at the lone wolf and not at the Americans. Eyewitnesses contradict the Pakistanis. Meanwhile, Islamabad has refused to release the report of its investigation into the shooting.
So what should the Obama administration do?
So far, it has been following the Bush Administration policy of muddling through. After all, the U.S. needs Pakistan to fight its war in land-locked Afghanistan. Almost 50% of troops’ food, medicine and other non-lethal supplies moves over Pakistan’s ports and roads. While this is down from 80% in the Bush years, it still means that Pakistan controls a vital supply line for our men in the field. Pakistan has nuclear weapons and an immense army and air force well-equipped with American technology. And it remains a vital source of intelligence about terrorists, when it cares to share that information with the U.S. So, the grey beards of foreign policy say, what can we do?
Actually, there is a lot that a creative Administration could do.
Shrink or end U.S. dependency on Pakistan as a supply line. Use our Central Asian allies to move more cargo by air and develop a supply line through India. Yes, the land route through India would be far longer and, on the Afghan side at least, roads and bridges would have to be improved. But we did the Berlin Airlift, we can do this. This would cost Pakistan in port fees, customs and prestige. And the symbol of using its enemy, India, would be deeply felt. It would be best to develop the India route in secret and announce its opening at a time of our choosing. It would be costly and prone to sabotage—but so is our current way of moving supplies. And so was the Berlin Airlift.
Direct the Voice of America to focus on corruption in Pakistan. Hard news reporting of payoffs to politicians and generals in Islamabad would electrify the opposition in Pakistan. America’s government-funded news service could also interview responsible opposition leaders, who would call for an end to military rule and the return of civil rights for women and minorities. This means working with Pakistan’s secular Left and its reformist lawyers. Again, the Obama Administration should feel at home championing the same message as the president outlined in his famous Cairo speech.
Stop selling military gear to Pakistan that it doesn’t need to fight terrorists. Why sell anti-submarine technology or anti-aircraft equipment or advanced avionics for jet fighters to Pakistan, when no terrorist outfit was a navy or an air force? Of course, this weaponry is designed to counter India, the world’s largest democracy and a friend to the United States. And much of this technology, like the wreck of the SEAL helicopter that crashed at bin Laden’s compound, is ultimately shared with China, which is not an American ally.
Call AT&T. Every month, the phone giant pays the government of Pakistan millions of dollars. Here’s how it works. Pakistan has to pay for access to AT&T’s satellites and undersea cables and AT&T pays for access to Pakistan’s phone network. Since roughly three times as many calls originate in America than they do in Pakistan, virtually every month AT&T owes Pakistan more than Pakistan owes AT&T. By executive order or congressional action, AT&T could be required to pay those funds into an escrow account in New York instead. The money would only be released on a monthly basis as Pakistan turns over named terrorists for trials in the United States or a place it designates. This amounts to bribing Pakistan with its own money, but it would work—especially if done in secret.
Something similar could be done with foreign aid as well as payments from Visa and Mastercard.
Inside the foreign policy bureaucracy, the complaint has long been that the relationship with Pakistan is “transactional, not strategic.” Attempts to transform the relationship have always failed—and no one tried harder than Admiral Mullen. Why not make it explicitly transactional and get value for our billions?
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