The Balochistan conflict is an ongoing conflict between Baloch nationalists and the governments of Pakistan and Iran in the Balochistan region of South-West Asia, which includes Balochistan Province in southwestern Pakistan, Sistan and Baluchestan Province in southeastern Iran, and the Balochistan region of southern Afghanistan.
Balochi demands include greater autonomy, increased royalties from natural resources and provincial revenue, and in some cases full independence. There have been many claims of human rights abuses.[17] The belligerent groups operate in the Pakistani and Iranian parts of the region, and in southern Afghanistan. In the 2010s, attacks against the Shia community by sectarian groups—though not always directly related to the political struggle—have been on the rise, contributing to tensions in Balochistan.[18][19]
In Pakistan's Balochistan province, insurgencies by Baloch nationalists have been fought in 1948, 1958-59, 1962-63 and 1973-77 — with a new ongoing and reportedly stronger, broader insurgency beginning in 2003.[20] This insurgency gained strength in conjunction with the deteriorating law and order situation in neighboring Afghanistan and instability at the Federal level. Insurgents had attacked "almost all prime installations" of the Pakistani government, including the military cantonment in Quetta, Balochistan's capital; important government buildings and "killed senior government officials".[21] As of May 2015, one foreign-based Baloch journalist (Malik Siraj Akbar) calls anger over military operations among people in the province "growing and often uncontrollable".[22]
Although it has vast natural resources, Balochistan is one of Pakistan’s poorest regions.[23] Baloch separatists allege that the central government of Pakistan is systematically suppressing development in Balochistan in order to keep the Balochs weak, whilst their opponents argue that international business interests have been unwilling to invest in the region due to the continuing unrest.[23]
The Balochistan Liberation Army, identified as a terrorist organization by Pakistan, Britain,[24] and other governments,[citation needed] is the most widely-known Baloch separatist group. Since 2000 it has conducted numerous deadly attacks on Pakistani troops, police, and civilians. Other separatist groups include Lashkar-e-Balochistan and the Baloch Liberation United Front (BLUF).[25][26][27][28]
In 2005, a rebellion by Baloch against the Islamic Republic of Iran began. The fight over the IRI Baloch region bordering Pakistan, has "not gained" as much ground as the conflict in Pakistan.[29] [30]
Area of dispute[edit]
Historical Balochistan covers the southern part of Sistan o Baluchestan Province, Iran, in the west, the Pakistani province of Balochistan in the east, and, in the northwest, Afghanistan's Helmand Province. The Gulf of Oman forms its southern border. Mountains and desert make up much of the region's terrain. Most Balochis live in Pakistan.
Although Balochistan Province is the largest region of Pakistan (44% of the country's total area), it is also the least inhabited (5% of total population), and the least developed.[31]Sunni Islam is the predominant religion.[32]
Stuart Notholt, in his Atlas of Ethnic Conflict, describes the unrest in Balochistan as a "nationalist/self-determination conflict".[33]
History[edit]
First conflict 1948[edit]
Balochistan consisted of four princely states under the British Raj. Three of these, Makran, Las Bela and Kharan willingly joined with Pakistan in 1947 after independence.[34]
The Khan of Kalat, Ahmed Yaar Khan chose independence as this was one of the options given to all of the 535 princely states byClement Attlee.[35]
Shortly after Pakistan's independence in 1947, the Pakistan Army began operations to subdue Kalat-based insurgents who had rejected the King of Kalat's decision to accede to Pakistan.
Balochistan consisted of four princely states under the British Raj. Three of these, Makran, Las Bela and Kharan willingly joined with Pakistan in 1947 after independence.[34]
The Khan of Kalat, Ahmed Yaar Khan chose independence as this was one of the options given to all of the 535 princely states byClement Attlee.[35]
Shortly after Pakistan's independence in 1947, the Pakistan Army began operations to subdue Kalat-based insurgents who had rejected the King of Kalat's decision to accede to Pakistan.
Second conflict 1958–59[edit]
Nawab Nowroz Khan took up arms in resistance to the One Unit policy, which decreased government representation for tribal leaders. He and his followers started a guerrilla war against Pakistan, and were arrested, charged with treason, and imprisoned in Hyderabad. Five of his family members (sons and nephews) were subsequently hanged under charges of treason and aiding in the murder of Pakistani troops. Nawab Nowroz Khan later died in captivity.[36]
Nawab Nowroz Khan took up arms in resistance to the One Unit policy, which decreased government representation for tribal leaders. He and his followers started a guerrilla war against Pakistan, and were arrested, charged with treason, and imprisoned in Hyderabad. Five of his family members (sons and nephews) were subsequently hanged under charges of treason and aiding in the murder of Pakistani troops. Nawab Nowroz Khan later died in captivity.[36]
Third conflict 1963–69[edit]
After the second conflict, a Baloch separatist movement gained momentum in the 1960s, following the introduction of a new constitution which limited provincial autonomy and enacted the 'One Unit' concept of political organization in Pakistan. Tension continued to grow amid consistent political disorder and instability at the federal level. The federal government tasked the Pakistan Army with building several new bases in key areas of Balochistan. Sher Muhammad Bijrani Marri led like-minded militants into guerrilla warfare by creating their own insurgent bases, spread out over 45,000 miles (72,000 km) of land, from the Mengal tribal area in the south to the Marri and Bugti tribal areas in the north. Their goal was to force Pakistan to share revenue generated from the Sui gas fields with the tribal leaders. The insurgents bombed railway tracks and ambushed convoys. The Army retaliated by destroying vast areas of the Marri tribe's land. This insurgency ended in 1969, with the Baloch separatists agreeing to a ceasefire. In 1970 Pakistani PresidentYahya Khan abolished the "One Unit" policy,[37] which led to the recognition of Balochistan as the fourth province of West Pakistan (present-day Pakistan), including all the Balochistani princely states, the High Commissioners Province, and Gwadar, an 800 km2 coastal area purchased from Oman by the Pakistani government.
After the second conflict, a Baloch separatist movement gained momentum in the 1960s, following the introduction of a new constitution which limited provincial autonomy and enacted the 'One Unit' concept of political organization in Pakistan. Tension continued to grow amid consistent political disorder and instability at the federal level. The federal government tasked the Pakistan Army with building several new bases in key areas of Balochistan. Sher Muhammad Bijrani Marri led like-minded militants into guerrilla warfare by creating their own insurgent bases, spread out over 45,000 miles (72,000 km) of land, from the Mengal tribal area in the south to the Marri and Bugti tribal areas in the north. Their goal was to force Pakistan to share revenue generated from the Sui gas fields with the tribal leaders. The insurgents bombed railway tracks and ambushed convoys. The Army retaliated by destroying vast areas of the Marri tribe's land. This insurgency ended in 1969, with the Baloch separatists agreeing to a ceasefire. In 1970 Pakistani PresidentYahya Khan abolished the "One Unit" policy,[37] which led to the recognition of Balochistan as the fourth province of West Pakistan (present-day Pakistan), including all the Balochistani princely states, the High Commissioners Province, and Gwadar, an 800 km2 coastal area purchased from Oman by the Pakistani government.
Fourth conflict 1973–77[edit]
For more details on this topic, see Baloch Insurgency and Rahimuddin's Stabilization.
The unrest continued into the 1970s, culminating in a government-ordered military operation in the region in 1973.
In 1973, citing treason, President Bhutto dismissed the provincial governments of Balochistan and NWFP and imposed martial law in those areas,[38] which led to armed insurgency. Khair Bakhsh Marri formed the Balochistan People’s Liberation Front (BPLF), which led large numbers of Marri and Mengal tribesmen into guerrilla warfare against the central government.[39] According to some authors, the Pakistani military lost 300 to 400 soldiers during the conflict with the Balochi separatists, while between 7,300 and 9,000 Balochi militants and civilians were killed.[14]
Assisted by Iran, Pakistani forces inflicted heavy casualties on the separatists. The insurgency fell into decline after a return to the four-province structure and the abolishment of the Sardari system.
For more details on this topic, see Baloch Insurgency and Rahimuddin's Stabilization.
The unrest continued into the 1970s, culminating in a government-ordered military operation in the region in 1973.
In 1973, citing treason, President Bhutto dismissed the provincial governments of Balochistan and NWFP and imposed martial law in those areas,[38] which led to armed insurgency. Khair Bakhsh Marri formed the Balochistan People’s Liberation Front (BPLF), which led large numbers of Marri and Mengal tribesmen into guerrilla warfare against the central government.[39] According to some authors, the Pakistani military lost 300 to 400 soldiers during the conflict with the Balochi separatists, while between 7,300 and 9,000 Balochi militants and civilians were killed.[14]
Assisted by Iran, Pakistani forces inflicted heavy casualties on the separatists. The insurgency fell into decline after a return to the four-province structure and the abolishment of the Sardari system.
Fifth conflict 2004–to date[edit]
See also: Sistan and Baluchestan insurgency
In 2005, the Baluch political leaders Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti and Mir Balach Marri presented a 15-point agenda to the Pakistan government. Their stated demands included greater control of the province's resources and a moratorium on the construction of military bases.[40] On 15 December 2005 the inspector general of the Frontier Corps, Major General Shujaat Zamir Dar, and his deputy Brigadier Salim Nawaz (the current IGFC) were wounded after shots were fired at their helicopter in Balochistan Province. The provincial interior secretary later said that, after visiting Kohlu, "both of them were wounded in the leg but both are in stable condition."[41]
In August 2006, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, 79 years old, was killed in fighting with the Pakistan Army, in which at least 60 Pakistani soldiers and 7 officers were also killed. Pakistan's government had charged him with responsibility of a series of deadly bomb blasts and a rocket attack on President Pervez Musharraf.[42]
In April 2009, Baloch National Movement president Ghulam Mohammed Baloch and two other nationalist leaders (Lala Munir and Sher Muhammad) were seized from a small legal office and were allegedly "handcuffed, blindfolded and hustled into a waiting pickup truck which is in still [sic] use of intelligence forces in front of their lawyer and neighboring shopkeepers." The gunmen were allegedly speaking in Persian (a national language of neighbouring Afghanistan and Iran). Five days later, on 8 April, their bullet-riddled bodies were found in a commercial area. The BLA claimed Pakistani forces were behind the killings, though international experts have deemed it odd that the Pakistani forces would be careless enough to allow the bodies to be found so easily and "light Balochistan on fire" (Herald) if they were truly responsible.[43] The discovery of the bodies sparked rioting and weeks of strikes, demonstrations, and civil resistance in cities and towns around Balochistan.[44] (See Turbat killings).
On 12 August 2009, Khan of Kalat Mir Suleiman Dawood declared himself ruler of Balochistan and formally announced a Council for Independent Balochistan. The council's claimed domain includes Sistan and Baluchestan Province, as well as Pakistani Balochistan, but does not include Afghan Baloch regions. The council claimed the allegiance of "all separatist leaders including Nawabzada Bramdagh Bugti." Suleiman Dawood stated that the UK had "a moral responsibility to raise the issue of Balochistan’s illegal occupation at international level."[45]
The Economist writes:
U.S.-based exiled Baloch journalist and newspaper editor Malik Siraj Akbar writes that the ongoing Baloch resistance has created "serious challenges" for the Pakistan government, "unlike the past resistance movements", because it has lasted longer than previous insurgencies, has greater breadth -- including the entire province "from rural mountainous regions to the city centers", involves Baloch women and children at "regular protest rallies", and has drawn more international attention -- including a 2012 hearing by the U.S. Congress. Islamabad has accused its neighbor India of supporting the insurgency in Balochistan.[21] However infighting between insurgent groups as of late 2014 has weakened the movement.[21]
See also: Sistan and Baluchestan insurgency
In 2005, the Baluch political leaders Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti and Mir Balach Marri presented a 15-point agenda to the Pakistan government. Their stated demands included greater control of the province's resources and a moratorium on the construction of military bases.[40] On 15 December 2005 the inspector general of the Frontier Corps, Major General Shujaat Zamir Dar, and his deputy Brigadier Salim Nawaz (the current IGFC) were wounded after shots were fired at their helicopter in Balochistan Province. The provincial interior secretary later said that, after visiting Kohlu, "both of them were wounded in the leg but both are in stable condition."[41]
In August 2006, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, 79 years old, was killed in fighting with the Pakistan Army, in which at least 60 Pakistani soldiers and 7 officers were also killed. Pakistan's government had charged him with responsibility of a series of deadly bomb blasts and a rocket attack on President Pervez Musharraf.[42]
In April 2009, Baloch National Movement president Ghulam Mohammed Baloch and two other nationalist leaders (Lala Munir and Sher Muhammad) were seized from a small legal office and were allegedly "handcuffed, blindfolded and hustled into a waiting pickup truck which is in still [sic] use of intelligence forces in front of their lawyer and neighboring shopkeepers." The gunmen were allegedly speaking in Persian (a national language of neighbouring Afghanistan and Iran). Five days later, on 8 April, their bullet-riddled bodies were found in a commercial area. The BLA claimed Pakistani forces were behind the killings, though international experts have deemed it odd that the Pakistani forces would be careless enough to allow the bodies to be found so easily and "light Balochistan on fire" (Herald) if they were truly responsible.[43] The discovery of the bodies sparked rioting and weeks of strikes, demonstrations, and civil resistance in cities and towns around Balochistan.[44] (See Turbat killings).
On 12 August 2009, Khan of Kalat Mir Suleiman Dawood declared himself ruler of Balochistan and formally announced a Council for Independent Balochistan. The council's claimed domain includes Sistan and Baluchestan Province, as well as Pakistani Balochistan, but does not include Afghan Baloch regions. The council claimed the allegiance of "all separatist leaders including Nawabzada Bramdagh Bugti." Suleiman Dawood stated that the UK had "a moral responsibility to raise the issue of Balochistan’s illegal occupation at international level."[45]
The Economist writes:
U.S.-based exiled Baloch journalist and newspaper editor Malik Siraj Akbar writes that the ongoing Baloch resistance has created "serious challenges" for the Pakistan government, "unlike the past resistance movements", because it has lasted longer than previous insurgencies, has greater breadth -- including the entire province "from rural mountainous regions to the city centers", involves Baloch women and children at "regular protest rallies", and has drawn more international attention -- including a 2012 hearing by the U.S. Congress. Islamabad has accused its neighbor India of supporting the insurgency in Balochistan.[21] However infighting between insurgent groups as of late 2014 has weakened the movement.[21]
Conflict in Iran[edit]
In 1928, the Shah Reza Pahlavi annexed the Independent State of Western Balochistan to Iran. Baloch activists complained that the new governance was centralized and dominated by the Persians, "forcing the Baloch community and other minorities to fight to protect their rights."[46]
Grievances by Baloch in Iran are that
- the Shi'ite Isalmic revolution perceives the predominantly the Sunni Baloch as a "threat".[46]
- province where they live (Sistan-e-Balochistan) has the worst indicators in Iran for life expectancy, adult literacy, primary school enrollment, access to improved water sources and sanitation, infant mortality rate.[46]
- despite its important natural resources (gas, gold, copper, oil and uranium), the province has the lowest per capita income in Iran: approximately almost 80% of the Baluch live under the poverty line.[46]
As of 2014 there are about two million ethnic Baloch in Iran.[46]
In 1928, the Shah Reza Pahlavi annexed the Independent State of Western Balochistan to Iran. Baloch activists complained that the new governance was centralized and dominated by the Persians, "forcing the Baloch community and other minorities to fight to protect their rights."[46]
Grievances by Baloch in Iran are that
- the Shi'ite Isalmic revolution perceives the predominantly the Sunni Baloch as a "threat".[46]
- province where they live (Sistan-e-Balochistan) has the worst indicators in Iran for life expectancy, adult literacy, primary school enrollment, access to improved water sources and sanitation, infant mortality rate.[46]
- despite its important natural resources (gas, gold, copper, oil and uranium), the province has the lowest per capita income in Iran: approximately almost 80% of the Baluch live under the poverty line.[46]
As of 2014 there are about two million ethnic Baloch in Iran.[46]
Attacks by insurgents[edit]
In the early 2000s the radical Islamist group Jundallah became active in Balochistan. The al Qaeda-linked terrorist organization has branches in both Iran and Pakistan. It carried out a wave of attacks in Iran in the late 2000s, including:
- 2007 Zahedan bombings: 18 people were killed.
- 2009 Zahedan bombing: 20 people were killed.
- 2009 Pishin bombing: 43 people were killed.
- July 2010 Zahedan bombings: 27 people were killed.
- 2010 Chabahar suicide bombing: 38 people were killed.
Among the deaths in the Pishin bombings were two Iranian Revolutionary Guards generals: Noor Ali Shooshtari, the deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards' ground forces, and Rajab Ali Mhammadzadeh, the Revolutionary Guards' Sistan and Baluchistan provincial commander.[47]
From 2006 to 2010, 254-346 people were killed in Jundullah-related violence in Iran.[48]
In 2010 the leader of Jundallah, Abdolmalek Rigi, was killed, causing fragmentation of the group but not an end to insurgent attacks.[46] In October 2013, the group Jaish al-Adl(JAA, Army of Justice), killed 14 Iranian border guards in an ambush in the town of Rustak, near the town of Saravan.[46] Shortly there after, the Iranian authorities executed 16 Balochs, on charges ranging from terrorism to drug trafficking.[46] Another group, Harakat Ansar Iran (Partisan Movement of Iran, HAI) killed two Basij officers and wounded numerous civilians in a October 2012 suicide bombing against the mosque of Imam Hussein, in the port city of Chabahar (Sistan and Baluchestan Province).[46]
According to analyst Daniele Grassi, "Salafism plays an increasingly central role" for the "post-Jundallah" militants of JAA and HAI. "The rhetoric of groups such as HAI and JAA uses strongly anti-Shia tones. The two groups often refer to the Iranian Islamic Republic as a Safavid regime, in reference to the Safavid dynasty which introduced Shiism in Iran."[46] Iran is also concerned about anti-Shia cooperation between the two groups and Da'ish.[46]
Iran has accused America of supporting Jundallah "for years"; the US government, which officially recognizes Jundallah as a terrorist organization, has denied this charge also.[49] Iran has been angered by JAA's use of Pakistani territory as a refuge, and has threatened military operations in Pakistan to counter terrorist groups "on several occasions".[46]
In the early 2000s the radical Islamist group Jundallah became active in Balochistan. The al Qaeda-linked terrorist organization has branches in both Iran and Pakistan. It carried out a wave of attacks in Iran in the late 2000s, including:
- 2007 Zahedan bombings: 18 people were killed.
- 2009 Zahedan bombing: 20 people were killed.
- 2009 Pishin bombing: 43 people were killed.
- July 2010 Zahedan bombings: 27 people were killed.
- 2010 Chabahar suicide bombing: 38 people were killed.
Among the deaths in the Pishin bombings were two Iranian Revolutionary Guards generals: Noor Ali Shooshtari, the deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards' ground forces, and Rajab Ali Mhammadzadeh, the Revolutionary Guards' Sistan and Baluchistan provincial commander.[47]
From 2006 to 2010, 254-346 people were killed in Jundullah-related violence in Iran.[48]
In 2010 the leader of Jundallah, Abdolmalek Rigi, was killed, causing fragmentation of the group but not an end to insurgent attacks.[46] In October 2013, the group Jaish al-Adl(JAA, Army of Justice), killed 14 Iranian border guards in an ambush in the town of Rustak, near the town of Saravan.[46] Shortly there after, the Iranian authorities executed 16 Balochs, on charges ranging from terrorism to drug trafficking.[46] Another group, Harakat Ansar Iran (Partisan Movement of Iran, HAI) killed two Basij officers and wounded numerous civilians in a October 2012 suicide bombing against the mosque of Imam Hussein, in the port city of Chabahar (Sistan and Baluchestan Province).[46]
According to analyst Daniele Grassi, "Salafism plays an increasingly central role" for the "post-Jundallah" militants of JAA and HAI. "The rhetoric of groups such as HAI and JAA uses strongly anti-Shia tones. The two groups often refer to the Iranian Islamic Republic as a Safavid regime, in reference to the Safavid dynasty which introduced Shiism in Iran."[46] Iran is also concerned about anti-Shia cooperation between the two groups and Da'ish.[46]
Iran has accused America of supporting Jundallah "for years"; the US government, which officially recognizes Jundallah as a terrorist organization, has denied this charge also.[49] Iran has been angered by JAA's use of Pakistani territory as a refuge, and has threatened military operations in Pakistan to counter terrorist groups "on several occasions".[46]
Drivers of insurgency[edit]
In Balochistan, Pakistan, "drivers" of insurgency have been economic, cultural, involving immigration and human rights.
In Balochistan, Pakistan, "drivers" of insurgency have been economic, cultural, involving immigration and human rights.
Economic inequality[edit]
Economic inequality, and Balochistan's status as a "neglected province where a majority of population lacks amenities" is a dimension in the conflict.[50][51] Since the mid-1970s Balochistan's share of Pakistan’s GDP has dropped from 4.9 to 3.7%.[52] Balochistan has the highest infant and maternal mortality rate, the highest poverty rate, and the lowest literacy rate in Pakistan.[53][51]
On the other hand, according to a report published in the Pakistani English-language Dawn newspaper, members of Balochistan's elite society, including provincial government ministers and officials, own "pieces of land greater in size than some small towns of the country", and had luxury vehicles, properties, investments and businesses valued at millions of rupees.[50]
Economic inequality, and Balochistan's status as a "neglected province where a majority of population lacks amenities" is a dimension in the conflict.[50][51] Since the mid-1970s Balochistan's share of Pakistan’s GDP has dropped from 4.9 to 3.7%.[52] Balochistan has the highest infant and maternal mortality rate, the highest poverty rate, and the lowest literacy rate in Pakistan.[53][51]
On the other hand, according to a report published in the Pakistani English-language Dawn newspaper, members of Balochistan's elite society, including provincial government ministers and officials, own "pieces of land greater in size than some small towns of the country", and had luxury vehicles, properties, investments and businesses valued at millions of rupees.[50]
Development issues[edit]
Gas revenue[edit]
Despite having more natural gas reserves than any other province in Pakistan, Balochistan receives less per/unit in royalties than Sindh and Punjab provinces, since Balochistan's wellhead price five times lower than in Sindh and Punjab (the gas wellhead price is based on per capita provincial income in 1953).[54] Furthermore, the government has returned little of the royalties owed to the province, citing the need to recover operating costs.[55] Consequently, Balochistan is heavily in debt.[56] [57]
Balochistan Province receives Rs32.71 per unit on gas revenues, including a royalty of Rs13.90, excise duty of Rs5.09, and gas development surcharge of Rs13.72. Many private individuals with gas deposits on their land also receive payments. Many Balochs argue that such royalties are too low.[58] In response, in 2011 Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani announced an addition of Rs. 120 billion (US$2.5 billion) to the gas development surcharge and royalty portion of the "Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan" package.[59]However, royalties often do not trickle down to the common people in Balochistan due to the corruption and wealth-hoarding of Baloch tribal chiefs. This has hindered the growth of infrastructure.[citation needed]
Despite having more natural gas reserves than any other province in Pakistan, Balochistan receives less per/unit in royalties than Sindh and Punjab provinces, since Balochistan's wellhead price five times lower than in Sindh and Punjab (the gas wellhead price is based on per capita provincial income in 1953).[54] Furthermore, the government has returned little of the royalties owed to the province, citing the need to recover operating costs.[55] Consequently, Balochistan is heavily in debt.[56] [57]
Balochistan Province receives Rs32.71 per unit on gas revenues, including a royalty of Rs13.90, excise duty of Rs5.09, and gas development surcharge of Rs13.72. Many private individuals with gas deposits on their land also receive payments. Many Balochs argue that such royalties are too low.[58] In response, in 2011 Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani announced an addition of Rs. 120 billion (US$2.5 billion) to the gas development surcharge and royalty portion of the "Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan" package.[59]However, royalties often do not trickle down to the common people in Balochistan due to the corruption and wealth-hoarding of Baloch tribal chiefs. This has hindered the growth of infrastructure.[citation needed]
Regional inequality[edit]
Extensive road and rail links developed by British colonialists in northern parts of Balochistan province have brought greater economic development to areas mainly inhabited by ethnic Pashtuns, which has also heightened nationalism among ethnic Balochs within the province.[57]
Extensive road and rail links developed by British colonialists in northern parts of Balochistan province have brought greater economic development to areas mainly inhabited by ethnic Pashtuns, which has also heightened nationalism among ethnic Balochs within the province.[57]
Gwadar[edit]
Another grievance is the construction of the megaport of Gwadar, which began in 2002 and is run entirely by the federal government. Among the complaints of Balochs are that
- construction of the port relies on Chinese engineers and laborers, and few Balochs have been employed.[60]
- According to one observer there has been little improvement in living standards for Balochs in the area.[60]
- A parallel town for workers at Gwadar is being built close to the old one in order to segregate Balochs from the growing influx of outsiders.[61][60]
- government officials illegally sold much of the land around Gwadar, making massive profits at the expense of local Balochs.[62][60]
- The Pakistan government has responded to the Baloch's increased resentment and resistance to their economic marginalization in Gwadar not by more generous policies, but by taking a more hardline approach. Army personnel have been posted in the area to secure it from insurgent attacks.[60]
Another grievance is the construction of the megaport of Gwadar, which began in 2002 and is run entirely by the federal government. Among the complaints of Balochs are that
- construction of the port relies on Chinese engineers and laborers, and few Balochs have been employed.[60]
- According to one observer there has been little improvement in living standards for Balochs in the area.[60]
- A parallel town for workers at Gwadar is being built close to the old one in order to segregate Balochs from the growing influx of outsiders.[61][60]
- government officials illegally sold much of the land around Gwadar, making massive profits at the expense of local Balochs.[62][60]
- The Pakistan government has responded to the Baloch's increased resentment and resistance to their economic marginalization in Gwadar not by more generous policies, but by taking a more hardline approach. Army personnel have been posted in the area to secure it from insurgent attacks.[60]
Multiculturalism and immigration[edit]
Due to the historical shortage of skilled labor in Balochistan, skilled workers are often imported from other regions.[63] Their arrival means new industries can develop, boosting the local economy; however, nationalists argue that this creates resentment amongst the local inhabitants. Like Karachi, which after migration from Balouchistan, Central Asia, Iran, East Asia and especially a large number of people arriving from other areas of Pakistan in search of daily living settled there, it has been a national financial hub in Pakistan.[64] thus the local inhabitants (Sindhis) became a minority in the largest city of their province. Nationalists argue against multiculturalism and non-Baloch immigration. Karachi city has been playing a key role as a financial hub for Pakistan and its economy has exploded to become on the major cities in Asia as a seaport. However, the city continues be a home for ethnic and sectarian violence. Balouch nationalist argue that migration leads to such events, and they are opposed to similar situation in Baluchistan. Mir Suleiman Dawood claims that the people in Balochistan remain deeply resentful of Pakistan's policies in the region and he, apart from other, rather militant, Baloch nationalist organisations have openly called for India's assistance in Balochistan's separation from Pakistan. On 12 August 2009, Khan of Kalat Mir Suleiman Dawood declared himself ruler of Balochistan and formally made announcement of a Council for Independent Balochistan. The Council's claimed domain includes "Baloch of Iran", apart from Pakistani Balochistan, but does not include Afghan Baloch regions, and the Council contains "all separatist leaders including Nawabzada Bramdagh Bugti."[65]
Perceived marginalization as a result of increased Pashtun migration from Afghanistan during the Afghan War is considered a driver of insurgency.[57]
Due to the historical shortage of skilled labor in Balochistan, skilled workers are often imported from other regions.[63] Their arrival means new industries can develop, boosting the local economy; however, nationalists argue that this creates resentment amongst the local inhabitants. Like Karachi, which after migration from Balouchistan, Central Asia, Iran, East Asia and especially a large number of people arriving from other areas of Pakistan in search of daily living settled there, it has been a national financial hub in Pakistan.[64] thus the local inhabitants (Sindhis) became a minority in the largest city of their province. Nationalists argue against multiculturalism and non-Baloch immigration. Karachi city has been playing a key role as a financial hub for Pakistan and its economy has exploded to become on the major cities in Asia as a seaport. However, the city continues be a home for ethnic and sectarian violence. Balouch nationalist argue that migration leads to such events, and they are opposed to similar situation in Baluchistan. Mir Suleiman Dawood claims that the people in Balochistan remain deeply resentful of Pakistan's policies in the region and he, apart from other, rather militant, Baloch nationalist organisations have openly called for India's assistance in Balochistan's separation from Pakistan. On 12 August 2009, Khan of Kalat Mir Suleiman Dawood declared himself ruler of Balochistan and formally made announcement of a Council for Independent Balochistan. The Council's claimed domain includes "Baloch of Iran", apart from Pakistani Balochistan, but does not include Afghan Baloch regions, and the Council contains "all separatist leaders including Nawabzada Bramdagh Bugti."[65]
Perceived marginalization as a result of increased Pashtun migration from Afghanistan during the Afghan War is considered a driver of insurgency.[57]
Education issues[edit]
A major factor in the Balouchistan conflict is education, which nationalists feeling has been neglected. The government of Pakistan recognises that importing skilled labour from other regions has caused tensions in the region, and has thus sought to encourage scholarships for Balochi students so they can participate in development programmes. The quota for Baloch students in Punjab university was doubled in 2010 under the Cheema Long Scheme, on the order of CM Shabaz Sharif. The provincial governments of Sindh, Punjab and KP said they would take steps to encourage Balochistan students to enroll and benefit from 100% scholarships.[66][67] However, nationalists argue that not enough education development is taking place, and that the government has neglected its duty.
A major factor in the Balouchistan conflict is education, which nationalists feeling has been neglected. The government of Pakistan recognises that importing skilled labour from other regions has caused tensions in the region, and has thus sought to encourage scholarships for Balochi students so they can participate in development programmes. The quota for Baloch students in Punjab university was doubled in 2010 under the Cheema Long Scheme, on the order of CM Shabaz Sharif. The provincial governments of Sindh, Punjab and KP said they would take steps to encourage Balochistan students to enroll and benefit from 100% scholarships.[66][67] However, nationalists argue that not enough education development is taking place, and that the government has neglected its duty.
Military response[edit]
Balochs have not tended to look favorably on Pakistan army intervention in politics as they saw the military as dominated by Punjabis and the interests of the Punjabis (who make up 45% of Pakistan's population) and lacking Baloch representation.[51]
In the insurgencies themselves, the military’s "harsh response" has led to "a spiral of violence".[68][69] (See Human Rights Issues below.) A report by the Pakistan Security Research Unit notes, “Islamabad’s militarized approach has led to … violence, widespread human rights abuses, mass internal displacement and the deaths of hundreds of civilians and armed personnel.”[70] According to the International Crisis Group the attempt to crush the insurgency as in earlier insurgencies is feeding Baloch disaffection.[71]Moderate Balochs have been alienated from the government by the imprisonment of civilians without charges, and routine kidnapping of dissidents.[69] [Note 1]
Balochs have not tended to look favorably on Pakistan army intervention in politics as they saw the military as dominated by Punjabis and the interests of the Punjabis (who make up 45% of Pakistan's population) and lacking Baloch representation.[51]
In the insurgencies themselves, the military’s "harsh response" has led to "a spiral of violence".[68][69] (See Human Rights Issues below.) A report by the Pakistan Security Research Unit notes, “Islamabad’s militarized approach has led to … violence, widespread human rights abuses, mass internal displacement and the deaths of hundreds of civilians and armed personnel.”[70] According to the International Crisis Group the attempt to crush the insurgency as in earlier insurgencies is feeding Baloch disaffection.[71]Moderate Balochs have been alienated from the government by the imprisonment of civilians without charges, and routine kidnapping of dissidents.[69] [Note 1]
Foreign support[edit]
Afghanistan[edit]
Main articles: Afghanistan-Pakistan relations and Durand Line
According to Robert Wirsing, Pakistan supported Islamist extremists, particularly Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hezb-e Islami, in their insurgency against the Afghan government of Mohammed Daoud Khan beginning in the early 1970s.[75] R. T. Naylor states that Islamabad supported these groups in reaction to efforts by Daoud Khan to arm Pashtun rebels in Pakistan. Daoud also established militant training camps in Afghanistan for Baloch rebels. These were the first modern training camps in the country.[76]
The former Pakistani ambassador to the US, Hussain Haqqani, wrote that in the 1970s training camps were set up in Afghanistan by Daoud to support Baloch separatists in Pakistan.[77] According to a student paper, "Pakistan’s fear that a communist Afghanistan would embolden the Baloch and Pashtun Marxist separatists in the western Pakistani province of Balochistan was confirmed when Daoud began supporting Marxist Baloch and Pashtun groups in eastern Afghanistan".[78]
“ As president, Daoud started antagonising Pakistan [...] He set up a training camp outside Kandahar for Baluch rebels to foment trouble across the border in Pakistan... ”
—Christian Parenti, Tropic of Chaos: Climate Change and the New Geography of Violence (2011), p.103[79]
Daoud Khan was removed from power in Afghanistan in 1978 by a communist coup.
In 2012, Pakistani interior minister Rehman Malik stated that Baloch Republican Party chief Brahamdagh Bugti was operating militant training camps in Afghanistan, which were dismantled only after Islamabad conveyed its knowledge of these camps to Kabul. Malik said that the camps in Afghanistan were responsible for training up to 5,000 insurgents, and that Bugti had hired three large houses in Kabul. The Pakistani minister claimed that the president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, had accepted that militants based in Afghanistan were fuelling terrorism in Balochistan.[80] The Pakistani Tribune wrote that "in response to Islamabad’s request, Kabul has formally given its assurance [that it will] stop the infiltration of militants from Kandahar to Balochistan’s border district Chaman."[81] Previously, Karzai had always denied that Balochs in Afghanistan were supporting an armed struggle in Balochistan.[82] According to wikileaks cables, Karzai said in a 2007 conversation with U.S. officials, "that [Baloch leader] Bugti had once tried to call Karzai but he had refused for the sake of good relations with Pakistan. Now he cannot forgive himself for refusing. Karzai assessed that Pakistan had troubles with many other tribes too, as a result of its trying to divide and conquer and turn the tribes against each other. Pakistan needed to address the bigger picture, Karzai urged."[82] Baloch leaders such as Bugti left Afghanistan for Switzerland.[80]
Against the backdrop of heavy criticism of Pakistan's paramilitary Frontier Corps over its alleged role in forced disappearances and human rights violations in Balochistan, the chief of FC troops in Balochistan, Major General Obaidullah Khan Khattak, said in June 2012 that "over 30 militant camps" had been established in Afghanistan and were being used "to launch terrorist and anti-state activities in Balochistan".[83]
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency has been accused of working with the Afghan Taliban in Balochistan, with the Taliban's leadership council, Quetta Shura, named after the provincial capital Quetta.[84][85][86] Some observers hope that the anti-Taliban Baloch separatists could act against the spread of Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces which are operating in Pakistani Balochistan and crossing into Afghanistan.[87]
Main articles: Afghanistan-Pakistan relations and Durand Line
According to Robert Wirsing, Pakistan supported Islamist extremists, particularly Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hezb-e Islami, in their insurgency against the Afghan government of Mohammed Daoud Khan beginning in the early 1970s.[75] R. T. Naylor states that Islamabad supported these groups in reaction to efforts by Daoud Khan to arm Pashtun rebels in Pakistan. Daoud also established militant training camps in Afghanistan for Baloch rebels. These were the first modern training camps in the country.[76]
The former Pakistani ambassador to the US, Hussain Haqqani, wrote that in the 1970s training camps were set up in Afghanistan by Daoud to support Baloch separatists in Pakistan.[77] According to a student paper, "Pakistan’s fear that a communist Afghanistan would embolden the Baloch and Pashtun Marxist separatists in the western Pakistani province of Balochistan was confirmed when Daoud began supporting Marxist Baloch and Pashtun groups in eastern Afghanistan".[78]
| “ | As president, Daoud started antagonising Pakistan [...] He set up a training camp outside Kandahar for Baluch rebels to foment trouble across the border in Pakistan... | ” |
—Christian Parenti, Tropic of Chaos: Climate Change and the New Geography of Violence (2011), p.103[79]
| ||
Daoud Khan was removed from power in Afghanistan in 1978 by a communist coup.
In 2012, Pakistani interior minister Rehman Malik stated that Baloch Republican Party chief Brahamdagh Bugti was operating militant training camps in Afghanistan, which were dismantled only after Islamabad conveyed its knowledge of these camps to Kabul. Malik said that the camps in Afghanistan were responsible for training up to 5,000 insurgents, and that Bugti had hired three large houses in Kabul. The Pakistani minister claimed that the president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, had accepted that militants based in Afghanistan were fuelling terrorism in Balochistan.[80] The Pakistani Tribune wrote that "in response to Islamabad’s request, Kabul has formally given its assurance [that it will] stop the infiltration of militants from Kandahar to Balochistan’s border district Chaman."[81] Previously, Karzai had always denied that Balochs in Afghanistan were supporting an armed struggle in Balochistan.[82] According to wikileaks cables, Karzai said in a 2007 conversation with U.S. officials, "that [Baloch leader] Bugti had once tried to call Karzai but he had refused for the sake of good relations with Pakistan. Now he cannot forgive himself for refusing. Karzai assessed that Pakistan had troubles with many other tribes too, as a result of its trying to divide and conquer and turn the tribes against each other. Pakistan needed to address the bigger picture, Karzai urged."[82] Baloch leaders such as Bugti left Afghanistan for Switzerland.[80]
Against the backdrop of heavy criticism of Pakistan's paramilitary Frontier Corps over its alleged role in forced disappearances and human rights violations in Balochistan, the chief of FC troops in Balochistan, Major General Obaidullah Khan Khattak, said in June 2012 that "over 30 militant camps" had been established in Afghanistan and were being used "to launch terrorist and anti-state activities in Balochistan".[83]
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency has been accused of working with the Afghan Taliban in Balochistan, with the Taliban's leadership council, Quetta Shura, named after the provincial capital Quetta.[84][85][86] Some observers hope that the anti-Taliban Baloch separatists could act against the spread of Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces which are operating in Pakistani Balochistan and crossing into Afghanistan.[87]
India[edit]
According to Baloch journalist in exile Malik Siraj Akbar, there is wide agreement in Pakistan that it is "India's involvement" in Balochistan that is "destabilizing" the province.[Note 2]Brahamdagh Bugti stated in a 2008 interview that he would accept aid from India, Afghanistan, and Iran in defending Baluchistan.[88] Pakistan has repeatedly accused India of supporting Baloch rebels,[73][74] and Wright-Neville writes that outside Pakistan, some Western observers also believe that India secretly funds the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).[89] In August 2013 US Special Representative James Dobbins said Pakistan's fears over India's role in Afghanistan were “not groundless".[90] Defence Secretary and former Senator Chuck Hagel said "India for some time has [...] used Afghanistan as a second front, and India has over the years financed problems for Pakistan on that side of the border".[91] However, former Af-Pak envoy Richard Holbrooke said in 2011 that while Pakistan had repeatedly shared its allegations with Washington, it had failed to provide any evidence to the United States that India was involved in separatist movements in Balochistan. He did not consider Pakistan's accusations against India credible.[92]Holbrooke also strongly rejected the allegation that India was using its consulates in Afghanistan to facilitate Baloch rebel activity, saying he had "no reason to believe Islamabad's charges", and that "Pakistan would do well to examine its own internal problems".[92] India has categorically denied the allegations, pointing to Pakistan's failure to provide evidence.[74]
Wikileaks cables strongly suggest that British intelligence officials are convinced of India's covert support for insurgents in Baluchistan, and were concerned that this support would increase in response to alleged Pakistani support for Lashkar-e-Taiba, following the 2008 Mumbai attacks.[93]
According to Baloch journalist in exile Malik Siraj Akbar, there is wide agreement in Pakistan that it is "India's involvement" in Balochistan that is "destabilizing" the province.[Note 2]Brahamdagh Bugti stated in a 2008 interview that he would accept aid from India, Afghanistan, and Iran in defending Baluchistan.[88] Pakistan has repeatedly accused India of supporting Baloch rebels,[73][74] and Wright-Neville writes that outside Pakistan, some Western observers also believe that India secretly funds the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).[89] In August 2013 US Special Representative James Dobbins said Pakistan's fears over India's role in Afghanistan were “not groundless".[90] Defence Secretary and former Senator Chuck Hagel said "India for some time has [...] used Afghanistan as a second front, and India has over the years financed problems for Pakistan on that side of the border".[91] However, former Af-Pak envoy Richard Holbrooke said in 2011 that while Pakistan had repeatedly shared its allegations with Washington, it had failed to provide any evidence to the United States that India was involved in separatist movements in Balochistan. He did not consider Pakistan's accusations against India credible.[92]Holbrooke also strongly rejected the allegation that India was using its consulates in Afghanistan to facilitate Baloch rebel activity, saying he had "no reason to believe Islamabad's charges", and that "Pakistan would do well to examine its own internal problems".[92] India has categorically denied the allegations, pointing to Pakistan's failure to provide evidence.[74]
Wikileaks cables strongly suggest that British intelligence officials are convinced of India's covert support for insurgents in Baluchistan, and were concerned that this support would increase in response to alleged Pakistani support for Lashkar-e-Taiba, following the 2008 Mumbai attacks.[93]
Iraq[edit]
Main article: Iraqi support of Baloch rebels
On 10 February 1973, Pakistani police and paramilitary raided the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad, seizing a large cache of small arms, ammunition, grenades and other supplies, which were found in crates marked 'Foreign Ministry, Baghdad'. The ammunition and weaponry was believed to be destined for Baloch rebels. Pakistan responded by expelling and declaring persona non grata the Iraqi Ambassador Hikmat Sulaiman and other consular staff. In a letter to President Nixon on February 14, Bhutto blamed India and Afghanistan, along with Iraq and the Soviet Union, for involvement in a “conspiracy … [with] subversive and irredentist elements which seek to disrupt Pakistan’s integrity”[94]
Main article: Iraqi support of Baloch rebels
On 10 February 1973, Pakistani police and paramilitary raided the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad, seizing a large cache of small arms, ammunition, grenades and other supplies, which were found in crates marked 'Foreign Ministry, Baghdad'. The ammunition and weaponry was believed to be destined for Baloch rebels. Pakistan responded by expelling and declaring persona non grata the Iraqi Ambassador Hikmat Sulaiman and other consular staff. In a letter to President Nixon on February 14, Bhutto blamed India and Afghanistan, along with Iraq and the Soviet Union, for involvement in a “conspiracy … [with] subversive and irredentist elements which seek to disrupt Pakistan’s integrity”[94]
USA[edit]
Syed F. Hasnat alleges that the Russian Federation (then Soviet Union), during the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979–1989), helped establish the Balochistan Liberation Army;[95][not in citation given] David Wright-Neville, however, writes that the Balochistan Liberation Army wasn't established until 2000.[89]
In February 2010 a Jundullah leader captured by Iran, Abdulmalek Rigi, alleged on Iranian TV "that the US had promised to provide" Jundullah "with military equipment and a base in Afghanistan, near the Iranian border" for its fight against Iran. Rigi did not mention assistance in fighting Pakistan (which Iran accuses of backing the Jundullah, according to the BBC). The US has denied links with Jundullah, and according to the BBC, "it is not possible" to determine whether Abdolmalek Rigi "made the statement freely or under duress."[96]
In late 2011, the Balochistan conflict became the focus of dialogue on a new U.S. South Asia strategy brought up by some U.S. congressmen, who said they were frustrated over Pakistan's alleged continued support to the Afghan Taliban, which they said led to the continuation of the War in Afghanistan (2001-present). Although this alternative to theObama Administration's Af-Pak policy has generated some interest, "its advocates clearly do not yet have broad support".[87]
In the 1980s the CIA, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, Pakistani Sunni extremist group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, and the Mujahedin e-Kalq supported a Baluchi tribal uprising against Iran.[2] A February 2011 article by Selig S. Harrison of the Center for International Policy called for supporting "anti-Islamist forces" along the southern Arabian Sea coast, including "Baluch insurgents fighting for independence from Pakistan", as a means of weakening the “rising tide of anti-American passion” in Pakistan and heading off any alliance between Islamabad and Beijing — Pakistan having granted China access to a naval base at Gwadar.[97]
Syed F. Hasnat alleges that the Russian Federation (then Soviet Union), during the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979–1989), helped establish the Balochistan Liberation Army;[95][not in citation given] David Wright-Neville, however, writes that the Balochistan Liberation Army wasn't established until 2000.[89]
In February 2010 a Jundullah leader captured by Iran, Abdulmalek Rigi, alleged on Iranian TV "that the US had promised to provide" Jundullah "with military equipment and a base in Afghanistan, near the Iranian border" for its fight against Iran. Rigi did not mention assistance in fighting Pakistan (which Iran accuses of backing the Jundullah, according to the BBC). The US has denied links with Jundullah, and according to the BBC, "it is not possible" to determine whether Abdolmalek Rigi "made the statement freely or under duress."[96]
In late 2011, the Balochistan conflict became the focus of dialogue on a new U.S. South Asia strategy brought up by some U.S. congressmen, who said they were frustrated over Pakistan's alleged continued support to the Afghan Taliban, which they said led to the continuation of the War in Afghanistan (2001-present). Although this alternative to theObama Administration's Af-Pak policy has generated some interest, "its advocates clearly do not yet have broad support".[87]
In the 1980s the CIA, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, Pakistani Sunni extremist group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, and the Mujahedin e-Kalq supported a Baluchi tribal uprising against Iran.[2] A February 2011 article by Selig S. Harrison of the Center for International Policy called for supporting "anti-Islamist forces" along the southern Arabian Sea coast, including "Baluch insurgents fighting for independence from Pakistan", as a means of weakening the “rising tide of anti-American passion” in Pakistan and heading off any alliance between Islamabad and Beijing — Pakistan having granted China access to a naval base at Gwadar.[97]
Dissociation of Baloch Society of North America[edit]
The Baloch Society of North America (BSO-NA) was a Baloch lobbying group founded in 2004 in Washington D.C.[98] by Dr. Wahid Baloch, a graduate of Bolan Medical Collegewho had gone into self-imposed exile in the United States in 1992. Between 2004 and 2014, his group had been trying to gain American (as well as Israeli) support for the independence of Balochistan. He held meetings with several American Congressmen and allegedly had meetings with several CIA officials. Dr. Baloch had long claimed that the Pakistani state was committing acts of genocide against the Baloch people, and that Islamabad's aim was to plunder the province's vast mineral resources. In January 2014 he released a letter appealing to the United States and Israel for direct assistance in preventing an alleged "killing spree of Baloch people" by the "Pakistani army".[99]
In May 2014, Dr. Baloch surprisingly decided to disband the BSO-NA, claiming that the War of Independence of Balochistan was actually a "war of independence of Khans, Nawabs and Sardars". He has since formed the Baloch Council of North America (BCN), which has dedicated itself to working with all democratic and nationalist forces in Pakistan to secure Baloch rights through democratic, nonviolent means, within the federation of Pakistan.[100]
The Baloch Society of North America (BSO-NA) was a Baloch lobbying group founded in 2004 in Washington D.C.[98] by Dr. Wahid Baloch, a graduate of Bolan Medical Collegewho had gone into self-imposed exile in the United States in 1992. Between 2004 and 2014, his group had been trying to gain American (as well as Israeli) support for the independence of Balochistan. He held meetings with several American Congressmen and allegedly had meetings with several CIA officials. Dr. Baloch had long claimed that the Pakistani state was committing acts of genocide against the Baloch people, and that Islamabad's aim was to plunder the province's vast mineral resources. In January 2014 he released a letter appealing to the United States and Israel for direct assistance in preventing an alleged "killing spree of Baloch people" by the "Pakistani army".[99]
In May 2014, Dr. Baloch surprisingly decided to disband the BSO-NA, claiming that the War of Independence of Balochistan was actually a "war of independence of Khans, Nawabs and Sardars". He has since formed the Baloch Council of North America (BCN), which has dedicated itself to working with all democratic and nationalist forces in Pakistan to secure Baloch rights through democratic, nonviolent means, within the federation of Pakistan.[100]
Baloch Council of North America[edit]
Formerly the BSO-NA, the Baloch Council of North America (BCN), led by Dr. Wahid Baloch, is a Baloch human rights group which aims to secure the rights of the Baloch people within a united Pakistan federation. Dr. Baloch has vowed that the BCN will work "within the Pakistani federation with the elected Balohcistan provincial government and pro-federation democratic, secular and nationalist forces of Pakistan to fight for and ensure the rights of Baloch people within the federation".[98]
Formerly the BSO-NA, the Baloch Council of North America (BCN), led by Dr. Wahid Baloch, is a Baloch human rights group which aims to secure the rights of the Baloch people within a united Pakistan federation. Dr. Baloch has vowed that the BCN will work "within the Pakistani federation with the elected Balohcistan provincial government and pro-federation democratic, secular and nationalist forces of Pakistan to fight for and ensure the rights of Baloch people within the federation".[98]
Human rights issues[edit]
Main article: Human rights violations in Balochistan
In the period 2003 to 2012, it is estimated that 8000 people were abducted by Pakistani security forces in Balochistan.[25] In 2008 alone, an estimated 1102 Baloch people disappeared.[101] There have also been reports of torture.[102] An increasing number of bodies "with burn marks, broken limbs, nails pulled out, and sometimes with holes drilled in their heads" are being found on roadsides as the result of a "kill and dump" campaign conducted by Pakistani security forces, particularly Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Frontier Corps (FC) — which, until the 9/11/01 World Trade Center attacks, had sided with the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.[103][104] In July 2011, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan issued a report on illegal disappearances in Balochistan and identified ISI and Frontier Corps as the perpetrators.[105] The Pakistan Rangers are also alleged to have committed a vast number of human rights violations in the region.[106] No one has been held responsible for the crimes.[103]
Islamist parties such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jamaat-e-Islami have systematically targeted Shia Muslims in Balochistan, with about 600 being killed in attacks in recent years.[25]
Main article: Human rights violations in Balochistan
In the period 2003 to 2012, it is estimated that 8000 people were abducted by Pakistani security forces in Balochistan.[25] In 2008 alone, an estimated 1102 Baloch people disappeared.[101] There have also been reports of torture.[102] An increasing number of bodies "with burn marks, broken limbs, nails pulled out, and sometimes with holes drilled in their heads" are being found on roadsides as the result of a "kill and dump" campaign conducted by Pakistani security forces, particularly Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Frontier Corps (FC) — which, until the 9/11/01 World Trade Center attacks, had sided with the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.[103][104] In July 2011, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan issued a report on illegal disappearances in Balochistan and identified ISI and Frontier Corps as the perpetrators.[105] The Pakistan Rangers are also alleged to have committed a vast number of human rights violations in the region.[106] No one has been held responsible for the crimes.[103]
Islamist parties such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jamaat-e-Islami have systematically targeted Shia Muslims in Balochistan, with about 600 being killed in attacks in recent years.[25]
Sunni Extremism & Religious Persecution of Zikris[edit]
According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) and other independent national and international media sources, the efforts of Pakistan governmental agenciesin countering Baloch nationalism, as well as the activities of terrorist organizations such as Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Pakistani Taliban, have produced a surge in religious extremism in Balochistan. Hindus, Shias (including Hazaras) and Zikris have been targeted, resulting in the migration of over 300,000 of them from Baluchistan.[107][108][109][110]
According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) and other independent national and international media sources, the efforts of Pakistan governmental agenciesin countering Baloch nationalism, as well as the activities of terrorist organizations such as Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Pakistani Taliban, have produced a surge in religious extremism in Balochistan. Hindus, Shias (including Hazaras) and Zikris have been targeted, resulting in the migration of over 300,000 of them from Baluchistan.[107][108][109][110]
Supreme Court investigation[edit]
There are more than 5,000 cases of ‘forced disappearances’ in Balochistan.[111][112] Many are innocent and stuck in Pakistan's slow court system whilst other are in prison awaiting charges on a range of things such as gun smuggling and robbery.[113] The chief justice of an apex court of Pakistan asked about the situation and said it was going out of control in Balochistan.[111][112] The Supreme Court is currently investigating the "missing persons" and issued an arrest warrant for the former Military Dictator Pervez Musharaff. Furthermore, the Chief Justice of the court said the military must act under the government's direction and follow well-defined parameters set by the Constitution.[114]
There are more than 5,000 cases of ‘forced disappearances’ in Balochistan.[111][112] Many are innocent and stuck in Pakistan's slow court system whilst other are in prison awaiting charges on a range of things such as gun smuggling and robbery.[113] The chief justice of an apex court of Pakistan asked about the situation and said it was going out of control in Balochistan.[111][112] The Supreme Court is currently investigating the "missing persons" and issued an arrest warrant for the former Military Dictator Pervez Musharaff. Furthermore, the Chief Justice of the court said the military must act under the government's direction and follow well-defined parameters set by the Constitution.[114]
Missing people found[edit]
In June 2011, the prime minister was informed that 41 missing people had returned to their homes, false cases against 38 had been withdrawn and several others had been traced. The PM urged police to trace the missing people and help them to return to their homes.[115]
In June 2011, the prime minister was informed that 41 missing people had returned to their homes, false cases against 38 had been withdrawn and several others had been traced. The PM urged police to trace the missing people and help them to return to their homes.[115]
Supreme Court orders[edit]
The Supreme Court apex court headed by Justice Iqbal decided ordered the government to the grant of subsistence allowance to the affected families. Justice Iqbal advised families not to lose hope. He said the issue of missing persons had become a chronic problem and, therefore, the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances, constituted on the orders of the apex court, should be made permanent.[116]
The Supreme Court apex court headed by Justice Iqbal decided ordered the government to the grant of subsistence allowance to the affected families. Justice Iqbal advised families not to lose hope. He said the issue of missing persons had become a chronic problem and, therefore, the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances, constituted on the orders of the apex court, should be made permanent.[116]
Affect of and remedies for the insurgency[edit]
Development issues[edit]
The government of Pakistan has repeatedly stated its intention to bring industrialisation to Balochistan, and continues to claim that progress has been made by way of the "Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan" package of political and economic reforms issued in 2009.[117] This is challenged by Baloch nationalist groups, who argue the benefits of these policies have not accrued to native Baloch residents of the province.[citation needed] Baloch nationalist groups continue to highlight the extraction of natural resources, especially natural gas, from the province, without discernible economic benefit to the Baloch people.[citation needed] Nonetheless, the government of Pakistan continues to insist that industrial zones are planned along the new Gawadar-Karachi highway. According to the government, this development is envisaged to bring accelerated progress in the future for the Baloch.[citation needed]
In February 2006 three Chinese engineers assisting in the construction of a local cement factory were shot and killed in an attack on their automobile,[118] while another 11 injured in a car bomb attack by BLA.[citation needed] China called back her engineers working on the project in Balochistan.[citation needed] The progress in the hydro-power sector has been slow since then.
The people of the region have largely maintained a nomadic lifestyle marked by poverty and illiteracy.[119][not in citation given] The indigenous people are continuously threatened by war and other means of oppression, which have resulted in the loss of thousands of innocent lives over many years.[120][121][122] Presently, according to Amnesty International, Baluch activists, politicians and student leaders are among those that are being targeted in forced disappearances, abductions, arbitrary arrests and cases of torture and other ill-treatment.[123]
The government of Pakistan has repeatedly stated its intention to bring industrialisation to Balochistan, and continues to claim that progress has been made by way of the "Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan" package of political and economic reforms issued in 2009.[117] This is challenged by Baloch nationalist groups, who argue the benefits of these policies have not accrued to native Baloch residents of the province.[citation needed] Baloch nationalist groups continue to highlight the extraction of natural resources, especially natural gas, from the province, without discernible economic benefit to the Baloch people.[citation needed] Nonetheless, the government of Pakistan continues to insist that industrial zones are planned along the new Gawadar-Karachi highway. According to the government, this development is envisaged to bring accelerated progress in the future for the Baloch.[citation needed]
In February 2006 three Chinese engineers assisting in the construction of a local cement factory were shot and killed in an attack on their automobile,[118] while another 11 injured in a car bomb attack by BLA.[citation needed] China called back her engineers working on the project in Balochistan.[citation needed] The progress in the hydro-power sector has been slow since then.
The people of the region have largely maintained a nomadic lifestyle marked by poverty and illiteracy.[119][not in citation given] The indigenous people are continuously threatened by war and other means of oppression, which have resulted in the loss of thousands of innocent lives over many years.[120][121][122] Presently, according to Amnesty International, Baluch activists, politicians and student leaders are among those that are being targeted in forced disappearances, abductions, arbitrary arrests and cases of torture and other ill-treatment.[123]
Economic effects and shortage of skilled workers and goods[edit]
The chief minister of the province has said
Rice traders from Punjab have also been killed in target killing, this has resulting in higher prices of foods items in Balochistan. Almost 40 people of non-Balochi ethnic groups were killed in 2009.[125]
The chief minister of the province has said
Rice traders from Punjab have also been killed in target killing, this has resulting in higher prices of foods items in Balochistan. Almost 40 people of non-Balochi ethnic groups were killed in 2009.[125]
MPA personal development budget[edit]
Funding for Balochistan’s annual development programme in 2010–11 was 27 billion rupees, as compared to 13 billion in 2007–08. This allowed each Member of the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan a personal development budget of 180 million for his or her constituency,[126] with the figure increasing to 250 million in 2011–2012. However, critics argue that development funding is not a fix for deep political issues, and that MPAs have no incentive to find political solutions with the insurgents when they believe they will receive more funding as long as the insurgency continues. There have also been allegations that MPAs are exploiting the PSDP programme to arrange kickback schemes and other forms of corruption.[127]
Funding for Balochistan’s annual development programme in 2010–11 was 27 billion rupees, as compared to 13 billion in 2007–08. This allowed each Member of the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan a personal development budget of 180 million for his or her constituency,[126] with the figure increasing to 250 million in 2011–2012. However, critics argue that development funding is not a fix for deep political issues, and that MPAs have no incentive to find political solutions with the insurgents when they believe they will receive more funding as long as the insurgency continues. There have also been allegations that MPAs are exploiting the PSDP programme to arrange kickback schemes and other forms of corruption.[127]
Gadani Energy Corridor[edit]
Four coal-fired power plants will be built Gadani, creating a power corridor in Balochistan based on the Houston Energy Corridor. This was announced by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during a visit to the region. The Gadani Power Park and it is expected to generate 5200 MW.[128][129] Some nationalist groups objected to the project, saying they had not been consulted and instead favoured expanding access to electricity in the province rather than increasing capacity.[citation needed] However, Nawaz Sharif's PMLN party is the largest party in the Provincial Assembly.
Four coal-fired power plants will be built Gadani, creating a power corridor in Balochistan based on the Houston Energy Corridor. This was announced by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during a visit to the region. The Gadani Power Park and it is expected to generate 5200 MW.[128][129] Some nationalist groups objected to the project, saying they had not been consulted and instead favoured expanding access to electricity in the province rather than increasing capacity.[citation needed] However, Nawaz Sharif's PMLN party is the largest party in the Provincial Assembly.
Farm subsidy[edit]
The Federal government announced it would transfer Rs4 billion subsidy to Provincial Government to be passed onto farmers in Balochistan to promote for tube-wells. The Provincial Government announced it would spend further Rs 3 billion to support the Federal Programme.[115] However, high levels of corruption amongst civil servants and senior ministers may mean the common man only gets partial benefit.
The Federal government announced it would transfer Rs4 billion subsidy to Provincial Government to be passed onto farmers in Balochistan to promote for tube-wells. The Provincial Government announced it would spend further Rs 3 billion to support the Federal Programme.[115] However, high levels of corruption amongst civil servants and senior ministers may mean the common man only gets partial benefit.
Army Education City at Sui[edit]
The Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan Army, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in January 2011 announced the establishment of Education City in Sui. The military said it had built colleges in Balouchistan to promote education, such as Balochistan Institute of Technical Education (BITE) and the Gwadar Institute of Technical Education (GITE), with approximately 1,673 graduates. Historically, the military-administrated institutions are less corrupted than civilian-managed ones. Presently, around 22,786 Baloch students are studying in military-run educational institutions.[130]
The Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan Army, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in January 2011 announced the establishment of Education City in Sui. The military said it had built colleges in Balouchistan to promote education, such as Balochistan Institute of Technical Education (BITE) and the Gwadar Institute of Technical Education (GITE), with approximately 1,673 graduates. Historically, the military-administrated institutions are less corrupted than civilian-managed ones. Presently, around 22,786 Baloch students are studying in military-run educational institutions.[130]
See also[edit]
Notes[edit]
- ^ Researcher Mickey Kupecz credits the political domination of Pakistan by the military to the tendency to respond to the insurgency with "overwhelming force" rather than with a political approach. "That the Baloch issue has been handled militarily rather than politically makes sense given the lack of civilian control over the country. Despite the restoration of democracy after the departure of General Pervez Musharraf, the military remains the dominant political authority and pays no heed to the commands of the civilian government. ... Unsurprisingly, its response to nearly any problem has been one of overwhelming force. As a consequence, Balochistan has become a third front for the military ..."[72]
- ^ Akbar himself finds the evidence lacking so far. "In Pakistan, everyone says they have incontrovertible evidence about India's involvement in destabilizing Balochistan. They only won't share the evidence with you because they insist that when evidence is already too evident then why should one make the evident, evident? Hence, there is national consensus that the assumption that there is evidence should be taken as the evidence and journalists and human rights activists should stop asking for making the evidence evident."[22]
- ^ Researcher Mickey Kupecz credits the political domination of Pakistan by the military to the tendency to respond to the insurgency with "overwhelming force" rather than with a political approach. "That the Baloch issue has been handled militarily rather than politically makes sense given the lack of civilian control over the country. Despite the restoration of democracy after the departure of General Pervez Musharraf, the military remains the dominant political authority and pays no heed to the commands of the civilian government. ... Unsurprisingly, its response to nearly any problem has been one of overwhelming force. As a consequence, Balochistan has become a third front for the military ..."[72]
- ^ Akbar himself finds the evidence lacking so far. "In Pakistan, everyone says they have incontrovertible evidence about India's involvement in destabilizing Balochistan. They only won't share the evidence with you because they insist that when evidence is already too evident then why should one make the evident, evident? Hence, there is national consensus that the assumption that there is evidence should be taken as the evidence and journalists and human rights activists should stop asking for making the evidence evident."[22]
References[edit]
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The civil war has left thousands dead - including non-Baloch settlers and has gone on for the past nine years, but it hardly made the news in Pakistan, let alone abroad.
- ^ a b Zeb, Rizwan (2011). "Traditional Power Structure and Ethnopolitical Conflict in Baluchistan: Target Killing of Punjabi Settlers as a Case Study" (PDF). Australian Political Science Association Conference. ANU College of Law.
The current insurgency which started in 2003-04 is also more organized and well equipped than the earlier ones, and more violent. One of the unique features of this is the target killing of the Punjabi settlers by the Baluch militant nationalist groups who view Punjabi settlers as outsiders and supporters and agents of the state.
[dead link]
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|date= (help)
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- ^ Harrison, Selig S. (1981). In Afghanistan's shadow: Baluch nationalism and Soviet temptations. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. pp. 27–28. ISBN 978-0-87003-029-1.
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- ^ “Conflict in Balochistan: HRC Fact-Finding Missions,” Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (August 2006): 56. In Balochistan the wellhead price is $0.38 while it is approximately $2 in the other provinces,
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- ^ “Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan,” International Crisis Group Asia Briefing No. 69 (October 2007): 9.
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- ^ Baloch, Sanaullah. “The Baloch Conflict: Towards a Lasting Peace,” Pakistan Security Research Unit No. 7 (March 2007): 5-6. 24 Khan, Adeel “Baloch Ethnic Nationalism
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|date= (help)
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Pakistan’s fear that a communist Afghanistan would embolden the Baloch and Pashtun Marxist separatists in the western Pakistani province of Balochistan was confirmed when Daoud began supporting Marxist Baloch and Pashtun groups in eastern Afghanistan.
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During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing today, Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, highlighted the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Agency's role in sponsoring the Haqqani Network - including attacks on American forces in Afghanistan. "The fact remains that the Quetta Shura [Taliban] and the Haqqani Network operate from Pakistan with impunity," Mullen said in his written testimony. "Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as US soldiers." Mullen continued: "For example, we believe the Haqqani Network--which has long enjoyed the support and protection of the Pakistani government and is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency--is responsible for the September 13th attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Kabul."
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the ISI wants us to kill everyone—policemen, soldiers, engineers, teachers, civilians—just to intimidate people
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Since July 2010 over 300 battered corpses have been flung on roadsides and in remote areas across the province. Baloch activists and human-rights organisations believe these men, insurgents and activists, were victims of a “kill and dump” policy run by the Frontier Corps (FC), a paramilitary force that works with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy agency. With burn marks, broken limbs, nails pulled out, and sometimes with holes drilled in their heads, the bodies are discarded, becoming food for dogs. The security forces deny any connection to the corpses. No one has been held responsible.
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- ^ a b c d B Raman (25 January 2003). "Iraq's shadow on Balochistan". Asia Times.Archived from the original on 22 November 2010. Retrieved 21 December 2010.
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- ^ "Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan". Asia Times. 25 February 2010. Archived from the original on 29 November 2010. Retrieved 21 December 2010.
- ^ a b c d "Eckhardt, SIPRI 1988: 3,000 military + 6,000 civilians = 9,000, Clodfelter: 3,300 govt. losses". Users.erols.com. Retrieved 14 October 2014.
- ^ a b c "Balochistan Assessment – 2010". Satp.org. Archived from the original on 11 November 2010. Retrieved 21 December 2010.
- ^ Goodenough, Patrick (20 June 2010). "Iran Executes Insurgent Leader, Accused of Ties With American Intelligence". CNSnews.com. Retrieved 21 December 2010.[dead link]
- ^ "Baloch separatists attack traders". BBC News. 27 July 2009. Retrieved 19 May 2012.
- ^ "Pakistan’s Shia Under Attack",by Phelim Kine;The Diplomat, July 05, 2014;http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/pakistans-shia-under-attack/; retvd 2 23 15
- ^ "We are the Walking Dead" - Killings of Shia Hazara in Balochistan, Pakistan, Human Rights Watch publication; http://www.hrw.org/node/126079; retvd 2 23 15
- ^ Hussain, Zahid (Apr 25, 2013). "The battle for Balochistan". Dawn. Retrieved 22 June2015.
- ^ a b c Akbar, Malik Siraj (3 November 2014). "The End of Pakistan's Baloch Insurgency?". World Post. Retrieved 24 June 2015.
- ^ a b Akbar, Malik Siraj (17 May 2015). "Betrayal in Balochistan". The World Post. Retrieved 25 June 2015.
- ^ a b Kemp, Geoffrey (2010). The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia's Growing Presence in the Middle East (1st ed.). Brookings Institution. p. 116. ISBN 978-0815703884.
- ^ Proscibed Terrorist Organisations, Home Office (Government of the United Kingdom)
- ^ a b c d e "Balochistan: "We only receive back the bodies"". The Economist (Quetta). 7 April 2012.[dead link]
- ^ a b "Waking up to the war in Balochistan". BBC News. 28 February 2012. Retrieved7 April 2012.
The civil war has left thousands dead - including non-Baloch settlers and has gone on for the past nine years, but it hardly made the news in Pakistan, let alone abroad.
- ^ a b Zeb, Rizwan (2011). "Traditional Power Structure and Ethnopolitical Conflict in Baluchistan: Target Killing of Punjabi Settlers as a Case Study" (PDF). Australian Political Science Association Conference. ANU College of Law.
The current insurgency which started in 2003-04 is also more organized and well equipped than the earlier ones, and more violent. One of the unique features of this is the target killing of the Punjabi settlers by the Baluch militant nationalist groups who view Punjabi settlers as outsiders and supporters and agents of the state.
[dead link] - ^ a b ""Their Future is at Stake": Attacks on Teachers and Schools in Pakistan's Balochistan Province" (PDF). Human Rights Watch. December 2010.
militant Baloch groups such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Baloch Liberation United Front (BLUF) seeking separation or autonomy for Balochistan have targeted Punjabis and other minorities, particularly in the districts of Mastung, Kalat, Nushki, Gwadar, Khuzdar, and Quetta.
- ^ Bhargava, G. S. “How Serious Is the Baluch Insurgency?,” Asian Tribune (Apr. 12, 2007) available at http://www.asiantribune.com/node/5285 (accessed Dec. 2, 2011)
- ^ Kupecz, Mickey (SPRING 2012). "PAKISTAN’S BALOCH INSURGENCY: History, Conflict Drivers, and Regional Implications" (PDF). INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW 20 (3): 106. Retrieved 24 June 2015. Check date values in:
|date=(help) - ^ "Technical Assistance Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Balochistan Economic Report"(PDF). Adb.org. Retrieved 14 October 2014.[dead link]
- ^ Countries and their Cultures -Baluchi. http://www.everyculture.com/wc/Norway-to-Russia/Baluchi.html retrvd 10 29 14
- ^ Notholt, Stuart (2008). Fields of Fire – An Atlas of Ethnic Conflict (Extended Edition). Stuart Notholt Communications Ltd. p. 228. ISBN 978-0-9556876-0-0.
- ^ Hasnat, Syed F. (2011). Global Security Watch—Pakistan (1st ed.). Praeger. p. 78.ISBN 978-0-313-34697-2.
- ^ Bennett Jones, Owen (2003). Pakistan: eye of the storm (2nd Revised ed.). Yale University Press. p. 132. ISBN 978-0-300-10147-8.
- ^ Harrison, Selig S. (1981). In Afghanistan's shadow: Baluch nationalism and Soviet temptations. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. pp. 27–28. ISBN 978-0-87003-029-1.
- ^ "Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan[dead link]," International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 119, p.4
- ^ The State of Martial Rule, Ayesha Jalal, Sang-e-Meel 1999 ISBN 969-35-0977-3 page 40.
- ^ Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005) p.79
- ^ "In Remote Pakistan Province, a Civil War Festers", The New York Times, 2 April 2006
- ^ "Pakistan general hurt in attack", BBC News, 15 December 2005
- ^ "Tribal Leader's Killing Incites Riots", The New York Times, 28 August 2006
- ^ Carlotta Gall (11 July 2009). "Another Insurgency Gains in Pakistan". The New York Times. Retrieved 14 October 2014.
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the ISI wants us to kill everyone—policemen, soldiers, engineers, teachers, civilians—just to intimidate people
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External links[edit]
- Baloch Society of North America
- Unrest simmers in Pakistan province
- Turbat killings[dead link]
- Interview of Balochistan National Party's Sanaullah Baloch[dead link]
- The real Balochistan by Sana Baloch
- Balochistan in focus by Rahimullah Yusufzai
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Pakistan separatist movement
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Post–Cold War conflicts in Asia
- Baloch Society of North America
- Unrest simmers in Pakistan province
- Turbat killings[dead link]
- Interview of Balochistan National Party's Sanaullah Baloch[dead link]
- The real Balochistan by Sana Baloch
- Balochistan in focus by Rahimullah Yusufzai
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